Thanks to Rewobs answer, I got the clue and found the answer. Basically, I got "lost in translation" and used the significance word, which is close, yet not exact. Trying to learn on signifiers, I got to the following pages:
Foundations of Affordances
Norman on affordances…. perceived affordances… signifiers
Which remind me of my semiotics classes, specifically Saussure's significado/significante (in my original language, which in English is signifier/signified, note the small difference!) and the relations between sign and symbols
So looking for that concept, the first result I got was Semiotics for Beginners which actually had the exact answer and it even uses the bathroom guy as example.
Peirce and Saussure used the term 'symbol' differently from each
other. Whilst nowadays most theorists would refer to language as a
symbolic sign system, Saussure avoided referring to linguistic signs
as 'symbols', since the ordinary everyday use of this term refers to
examples such as a pair of scales (signifying justice), and he
insisted that such signs are 'never wholly arbitrary. They are not
empty configurations'. They 'show at least a vestige of natural
connection' between the signifier and the signified - a link which he
later refers to as 'rational' (Saussure 1983, 68, 73; Saussure 1974,
68, 73). Whilst Saussure focused on the arbitrary nature of the
linguistic sign, a more obvious example of arbitrary symbolism is
mathematics. Mathematics does not need to refer to an external world
at all: its signifieds are indisputably concepts and mathematics is a
system of relations (Langer 1951, 28).
For Peirce, a symbol is 'a sign which refers to the object that it
denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas,
which operates to cause the symbol to be interpreted as referring to
that object' (Peirce 1931-58, 2.249). We interpret symbols according
to 'a rule' or 'a habitual connection' (ibid., 2.292, 2.297, 1.369).
'The symbol is connected with its object by virtue of the idea of the
symbol-using animal, without which no such connection would exist'
(ibid., 2.299). It 'is constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact
that it is used and understood as such' (ibid., 2.307). It 'would lose
the character which renders it a sign if there were no interpretant'
(ibid., 2.304). A symbol is 'a conventional sign, or one depending
upon habit (acquired or inborn)' (ibid., 2.297). 'All words,
sentences, books and other conventional signs are symbols' (ibid.,
2.292). Peirce thus characterizes linguistic signs in terms of their conventionality in a similar way to Saussure. In a rare direct
reference to the arbitrariness of symbols (which he then called
'tokens'), he noted that they 'are, for the most part, conventional or
arbitrary' (ibid., 3.360). A symbol is a sign 'whose special
significance or fitness to represent just what it does represent lies
in nothing but the very fact of there being a habit, disposition, or
other effective general rule that it will be so interpreted. Take, for
example, the word "man". These three letters are not in the least like
a man; nor is the sound with which they are associated' (ibid.,
4.447). He adds elsewhere that 'a symbol... fulfills its function regardless of any similarity or analogy with its object and equally
regardless of any factual connection therewith' but solely because it
will be interpreted as a sign (ibid., 5.73; original emphasis).
Turning to icons, Peirce declared that an iconic sign represents its
object 'mainly by its similarity' (Peirce 1931-58, 2.276). A sign is
an icon 'insofar as it is like that thing and used as a sign of it'
(ibid., 2.247). Indeed, he originally termed such modes, 'likenesses'
(e.g. ibid., 1.558). He added that 'every picture (however
conventional its method)' is an icon (ibid., 2.279). Icons have
qualities which 'resemble' those of the objects they represent, and
they 'excite analogous sensations in the mind' (ibid., 2.299; see also
3.362). Unlike the index, 'the icon has no dynamical connection with the object it represents' (ibid.). Just because a signifier resembles
that which it depicts does not necessarily make it purely iconic. The
philosopher Susanne Langer argues that 'the picture is essentially a
symbol, not a duplicate, of what it represents' (Langer 1951, 67).
Pictures resemble what they represent only in some respects. What we
tend to recognize in an image are analogous relations of parts to a
whole (ibid., 67-70). For Peirce, icons included 'every diagram, even
although there be no sensuous resemblance between it and its object,
but only an analogy between the relations of the parts of each'
(Peirce 1931-58, 2.279). 'Many diagrams resemble their objects not at
all in looks; it is only in respect to the relations of their parts
that their likeness consists' (ibid., 2.282). Even the most
'realistic' image is not a replica or even a copy of what is depicted.
We rarely mistake a representation for what it represents.
Semioticians generally maintain that there are no 'pure' icons - there
is always an element of cultural convention involved. Peirce stated
that although 'any material image' (such as a painting) may be
perceived as looking like what it represents, it is 'largely
conventional in its mode of representation' (Peirce 1931-58, 2.276).
'We say that the portrait of a person we have not seen is convincing.
So far as, on the ground merely of what I see in it, I am led to form
an idea of the person it represents, it is an icon. But, in fact, it
is not a pure icon, because I am greatly influenced by knowing that it
is an effect, through the artist, caused by the original's
appearance... Besides, I know that portraits have but the slightest
resemblance to their originals, except in certain conventional
respects, and after a conventional scale of values, etc.' (ibid.,
2.92).
Guy Cook asks whether the iconic sign on the door of a public lavatory
for men actually looks more like a man than like a woman. 'For a sign
to be truly iconic, it would have to be transparent to someone who had
never seen it before - and it seems unlikely that this is as much the
case as is sometimes supposed. We see the resemblance when we already
know the meaning' (Cook 1992, 70). Thus, even a 'realistic' picture is
symbolic as well as iconic.
Iconic and indexical signs are more likely to be read as 'natural'
than symbolic signs when making the connection between signifier and
signified has become habitual. Iconic signifiers can be highly
evocative. Kent Grayson observes: 'Because we can see the object in
the sign, we are often left with a sense that the icon has brought us
closer to the truth than if we had instead seen an index or a symbol'
(Grayson 1998, 36). He adds that 'instead of drawing our attention to
the gaps that always exist in representation, iconic experiences
encourage us subconsciously to fill in these gaps and then to believe
that there were no gaps in the first place... This is the paradox of
representation: it may deceive most when we think it works best'
(ibid., 41).
The final answer
In short, while not widespread in UX, the correct answer is signified, although signifier could be more appropriate for people more related to technological systems than semiotics
